17 ideas
| 7440 | Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong] |
| 6445 | You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose] |
| 7437 | Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong] |
| 7434 | Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7436 | The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong] |
| 7429 | Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong] |
| 7438 | A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong] |
| 7431 | The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong] |
| 7432 | One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong] |
| 4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
| 4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
| 4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
| 4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
| 4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
| 4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
| 4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
| 4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |